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Abstract
The covariation of option-implied disaster concern of the market index and indi-
vidual stocks allows me to estimate the conditional and systematic disaster concern of
stocks with respect to the market. The estimated conditional and systematic disaster
concern variables can be interpreted in terms of the risk-neutral conditional disaster
probabilities, and they strongly predict future realizations of stock-level disasters and
stock returns in di¤erent market states. This suggests that the comovement of option
prices between stocks and the market index carries forward-looking information on
their joint tail distributions.
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1 Introduction
Rare disasters occur with very small probabilities, but they can cause extremely negative
outcomes conditional upon occurrence. Given the low frequency and severe impact of rare
disasters, researchers have spent considerable e¤orts in quantifying disaster risk. A recent
strand of literature proposes using option prices to estimate investorsperception of the
future disaster risk, namely, the disaster concern (e.g., Bollerslev and Todorov (2011,
2014), Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu (2015), Gao, Lu, and Song (2017), and Gao, Gao, and
Song (2017)). Compared to estimating disaster risk from realized equity returns, inferring
disaster concern from option prices has two advantages. First, it gives rise to forward-
looking measures of disaster risk, reecting investorsexpectations on the future likelihood
of rare disasters. Second, the availability of option prices at a broad range of strike prices
allows for the estimation of disaster concern without the actual realization of disastrous
events. Despite these advantages, the investigation of option-implied disaster concern is
mostly restricted to the aggregate market. Little attention is paid to the disaster concern
of individual assets and the systematic variations of individual asset disaster concern with
that of the market.
This paper studies the joint behavior of the option-implied disaster concern of individual
stocks and the market index. I exploit the covariation of stock and market disaster concern
to estimate the conditional and systematic disaster concern of stocks with respect to the
market, which can be intuitively interpreted in terms of the risk-neutral conditional disaster
probabilities. The estimated conditional and systematic disaster concern variables exhibit
substantial uctuations both in the time series and in the cross section. They strongly
predict the future realization of stock-level disasters and stock returns in di¤erent states
of the market and can be used to construct protable trading strategies. These ndings
support that the comovement of option prices between stocks and the market index contains
forward-looking information on their joint tail distributions.
I consider an individual asset and a market index in a one-period setting. Both the
market and the asset can fall in either of two states, disaster or non-disaster, depending
on their returns over the period. For both the market and the asset, I dene disaster
concern as the ex-ante risk-neutral probability that the corresponding return falls in the
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disaster state. Measuring disaster concern as the risk-neutral disaster probability implies
that it increases with both the physical probability of disasters and investorsrisk aversion.
I next dene the conditional disaster concern of the asset given disaster and non-disaster
markets as the ex-ante risk-neutral conditional disaster probability of the asset given that
the market index will fall in the disaster and non-disaster states, respectively. Then, I
dene the assets systematic disaster concern as the di¤erence in its conditional disaster
concern given disaster versus non-disaster markets. Intuitively, the systematic disaster
concern measure describes how much more likely an asset is expected to experience a
disaster if a market-wide disaster occurs over the coming period relative to if the market
performs normally. Using the total probability formula, I show that my systematic disaster
concern measure captures the sensitivity of the asset disaster concern to the market disaster
concern.
The empirical estimation of the conditional and systematic disaster concern variables
requires that both the individual asset and the market index have traded options. The
estimation consists of two steps. In the rst step, I estimate the market disaster concern
and the asset disaster concern from prices of options written on the market index and the
asset, respectively, using the method of Ross (1976) and Breeden and Litzenberger (1978).
In the second step, motivated by the total probability formula I conduct a time-series
linear regression to estimate the conditional and systematic disaster concern of the asset
using the market and asset disaster concern obtained from the rst step. In particular,
I impose as constraints on the regression that the conditional disaster concern variables
must lie between zero and one to ensure that the resulting estimates can be interpreted as
risk-neutral conditional probabilities.
Existing papers often measure the systematic disaster risk of an individual asset as the
sensitivity of the realized asset return to the market disaster risk (e.g., Kelly and Jiang
(2014) and Gao, Lu, and Song (2017)). This approach in essence focuses only on the market
disaster risk. In contrast, my approach emphasizes the joint disaster risk of the asset and
the market. By using option prices, my measures are able to answer what ifquestions
that depend on hypothetical future states of the market. For example, what would be the
perceived disaster risk of an asset if the market performs well in the coming period. What
would be the expected incremental likelihood of an asset disaster if the market switches
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from the non-disaster state to the disaster state. These questions are di¢ cult to answer
by looking at realize returns, but the comovement of option prices between the asset and
the market index allows me to conveniently address them.
I next turn to estimating the conditional and systematic disaster concern for a large
set of stocks. I choose the S&P 500 index as the proxy for the market index, which has
actively traded options at a broad range of strike prices. I use all common stocks with
active option trading as candidates for the individual asset. For both the market and the
stocks, I dene the disaster and non-disaster states based on monthly equity returns, and
hence the corresponding disaster concern variables can be estimated using prices of options
maturing in one month. In particular, I dene that the market index is in the disaster or
non-disaster state if its monthly return is below or above -10%, respectively. Similarly, a
stock is dened to be in the disaster or non-disaster state if its monthly return is below or
above -25%, respectively. These disaster thresholds are chosen based on historical equity
return distributions.
The estimated conditional disaster concern is on average much higher given disaster
markets than given non-disaster markets, resulting in positive systematic disaster concern
estimates. This reects that investors expect higher stock-level disaster risk if the market
overall will experience a disaster than if it will not. The conditional and systematic disaster
concern variables exhibit wide uctuations both in the time series and in the cross section.
For example, the systematic disaster concern of Microsoft peaks around the Internet Bub-
ble, whereas that of Bank of America (BOA) peaks around the nancial crisis. This is
consistent with economic intuitions. In addition, the systematic disaster concern variable
has a weak correlation with the market disaster concern beta (sensitivity of stock returns
to the market disaster concern, which is the common approach in the literature to measure
the systematic disaster risk of individual assets). This suggests that these two approaches
capture di¤erent aspects of individual assetsexposure to systematic disaster risk.
I then ask whether the estimated conditional and systematic disaster concern variables
are informative on the future realization of stock-level disasters and stock returns. My
results show that the conditional disaster concern strongly predicts the occurrence of stock
disasters in the corresponding market state. In particular, increasing the conditional dis-
aster concern given disaster (non-disaster) markets from zero to one increases the future
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probability of stock disasters by 31% (58%) in the realized disaster (non-disaster) state of
the market. The relation between systematic disaster concern and future stock returns also
depends on the market performance. Specically, stocks with higher systematic disaster
concern on average earn higher (lower) future returns if the future market return is pos-
itive (negative), and these results cannot be explained by the CAPM beta or the market
disaster concern beta. Unconditionally, there is a hump-shaped relation between system-
atic disaster concern and future stock returns, and hence protable trading strategies can
be constructed by going long in stocks with middle levels of systematic disaster concern
and shorting a combination of stocks with the lowest and the highest systematic disaster
concern. All of these ndings provide evidence that the comovement of option-implied
disaster concern between the stocks and the market index indeed carries forward-looking
information on their joint return distributions, especially at the tails.
Finally, I examine the relation between systematic disaster concern and a variety of
stock and rm characteristics. In general, systematic disaster concern is higher for stocks
with larger CAPM betas, more negative market disaster concern betas, higher idiosyncratic
volatility and illiquidity, smaller market capitalization, lower returns on equity and lever-
age, and higher book-to-market ratios and investment. However, stocks with the lowest
systematic disaster concern tend to be very illiquid with small market capitalization and
below-average CAPM betas.
This paper is related to the growing literature on disaster risk. A large body of re-
search has shown that the economy is subject to rare disasters and that disaster risk has
important implications on asset prices and the equity and variance risk premia (e.g., Rietz
(1988), Barro (2006, 2009), Barro and Ursúa (2008), Gabaix (2008, 2012), Chen, Joslin,
and Tran (2012), Gourio (2012), Nakamura et al. (2013), Wachter (2013), and Seo and
Wachter (2017)). Various measures of disaster risk have been proposed to examine its
relation with equity returns both in the time series and in the cross section (e.g., Bollerslev
and Todorov (2011, 2014), Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2014), Kelly and Jiang (2014),
Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu (2015), van Oordt and Zhou (2016), Chabi-Yo, Ruenzi, and
Weigert (2017), Gao, Gao, and Song (2017), and Gao, Lu, and Song (2017)). In particular,
Bollerslev and Todorov (2011, 2014), Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu (2015), Gao, Gao, and
Song (2017), and Gao, Lu, and Song (2017) focus on the option-implied disaster concern of
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the market index that capture investorsperception of the future disaster risk of the overall
economy. To the best of my knowledge, my paper is the rst to explore individual assets
option-implied disaster concern and its systematic variations with respect to the market.
The paper also contributes to the extensive research on the comovement of individual
assets with the market. It is widely acknowledged that individual asset returns comove
with the market return. Plenty of empirical evidence suggests that this return comove-
ment increases during market downturns (e.g., Roll (1988), Jorion (2000), and Longin
and Solnik (2001)), and various methods have been developed to test this asymmetric re-
turn comovement (e.g., Ang and Chen (2002), Hong, Tu, and Zhou (2007), and Jiang,
Wu, and Zhou (2017)). Another strand of research documents liquidity commonality of
individual stocks with the market (e.g., Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000), Has-
brouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka (2001)), and many papers examine
both supply-side and demand-side explanations for this liquidity commonality (e.g., Chor-
dia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), Coughenour and Saad
(2004), Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010), and Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012)).
Recently, Christo¤ersen, Fournier, and Jacobs (2017) shows that the market is a common
factor driving the variations in equity option prices. My paper provides further evidence
that the option prices of individual stocks comove with those of the market index and that
this comovement is informative on the joint tail distributions of stock and market returns.
My paper also adds to the literature on estimating the risk-neutral return distributions
from option prices. Ross (1976) and Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) rst show that
one can extract the risk-neutral probability distribution of security returns from prices
of European options written on the security of interest. Since then, many parametric and
nonparametric methods have been proposed to rene the estimation. (See Jackwerth (1999)
for a review.) Overall, the literature has restricted attention to estimating the risk-neutral
marginal return distributions. My paper extends this literature by providing an approach
of estimating the risk-neutral conditional return distribution of an individual asset given
the market return.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 denes the conditional and sys-
tematic disaster concern measures. Section 3 explains how to estimate these measures
from option prices. Section 4 empirically estimates the conditional and systematic disas-
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ter concern variables and investigates their performance in predicting stock-level disasters
and stock returns in di¤erent states of the market. Section 5 concludes. Some technical
discussions are delegated to the Appendix.
2 A Measure of Systematic Disaster Concern
Consider a market index M and an individual asset i in a one-period setting. Suppose
that the return of the market over the period can fall in either a disaster state (DM ) or
a non-disaster state (NM ): Similarly, the return of asset i can also be in a disaster state
(Di) or a non-disaster state (N i):
For both the market index and the individual asset, dene the disaster concern as the
risk-neutral probability evaluated at the beginning of the period that the corresponding
return will fall in the disaster state, i.e.,
DisM = Q
 
rM 2 DM ;
Disi = Q
 
ri 2 Di ;
where DisM and Disi represent the market disaster concern and the asset disaster concern,
rM and ri are the market return and the asset return over the period, and Q stands for the
risk-neutral probability. Intuitively, the risk-neutral probability is equal to the associated
physical probability adjusted for risk aversion. The idea of dening disaster concern as
the risk-neutral disaster probability is that it depends on both the physical probability of
disaster and investorsaversion towards risk. Given the same level of risk aversion, disaster
concern increases with the physical probability of disaster. Given the same physical disaster
probability, the more risk averse investors are, the higher disaster concern they have.
I dene the conditional disaster concern of the asset given disaster and non-disaster mar-
kets, ConDisi
 
DM

and ConDisi
 
NM

; as the risk-neutral conditional disaster probabil-
ity of the asset return given that the market return will be in the disaster and non-disaster
states, respectively, i.e.,
ConDisi
 
DM

= Q
 
ri 2 DijrM 2 DM ;
ConDisi
 
NM

= Q
 
ri 2 DijrM 2 NM :
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I further dene the systematic disaster concern of the asset, SysDisi; as the di¤erence
in its conditional disaster concern given disaster versus non-disaster markets, i.e.,
SysDisi = ConDisi
 
DM
  ConDisi  NM : (1)
Intuitively, the systematic disaster concern describes by how much an asset is perceived to
be more likely to experience a disaster if the market overall will have a disaster relative to
if the market performs normally.
To better understand the economic meaning of the systematic disaster concern mea-
sure, it is useful to consider the total probability formula under the risk-neutral measure.
According to the total probability formula, the disaster probability of an asset is equal to
the weighted average of its conditional disaster probabilities given the market state, with
the associated weights being the probabilities of the corresponding market states, i.e.,
Q
 
ri 2 Di = Q  rM 2 DMQ  ri 2 DijrM 2 DM+Q  rM 2 NMQ  ri 2 DijrM 2 NM :
Equivalently, this can be rewritten as
Disi = DisM  ConDisi  DM+  1 DisMConDisi  NM (2)
= ConDisi
 
NM

+

ConDisi
 
DM
  ConDisi  NMDisM (3)
= ConDisi
 
NM

+ SysDisi DisM : (4)
This implies that Disi is linearly related to DisM ; with SysDisi being the slope and
ConDisi
 
NM

being the intercept. Hence, the systematic disaster concern of an asset
measures the sensitivity of the asset disaster concern to the market disaster concern. This
is comparable to the CAPM beta, which captures the sensitivity of the asset return to the
market return and is used as the standard measure of systematic risk.
Since ConDisi
 
DM

and ConDisi
 
NM

are risk-neutral conditional probabilities which
take values from 0 to 1, SysDisi ranges from -1 to 1. In particular, a positive value of
SysDisi means that the asset disaster concern becomes higher when the market disaster
concern rises. In other words, the asset is perceived to be more prone to disasters if the
market will be in the disaster state relative to the non-disaster state. In contrast, a nega-
tive value of SysDisi indicates that the asset disaster concern decreases when the market
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disaster concern rises, or equivalently, the asset is considered less likely to experience a
disaster if the market will be in the disaster state relative to the non-disaster state. While
theoretically SysDisi can be either positive or negative, in practice I expect it to be positive
more often, reecting that investors tend to become more concerned about asset disasters
when the market disaster concern is higher.
Notice that the systematic disaster concern measure dened here is di¤erent from the
existing approach used in the literature to gauge the disaster risk of individual assets with
respect to the market. A number of papers, including Kelly and Jiang (2014) and Gao, Lu,
and Song (2017), use the sensitivity of individual asset returns to the market disaster risk
to measure the systematic disaster risk of an asset. By doing this, they still focus on the
disaster risk of the market index. My systematic disaster concern measure, in comparison,
focuses on the joint behavior of the asset disaster concern and the market disaster concern.
I will show in Section 4 that these two approaches lead to di¤erent measures that are likely
to capture di¤erent aspects of individual assetsexposure to systematic disaster risk.
3 Estimation Methodology
Ross (1976) and Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) show that the risk-neutral return distri-
bution of any asset with traded options can be estimated from prices of European options
written on that asset. The conditional and systematic disaster concern measures intro-
duced above are dened in terms of the risk-neutral conditional distribution of the asset
return given the state of the market. Intuitively, estimation of these measures would re-
quire options written on the joint values of both the asset and the market index. This
poses an empirical challenge, since such options are not traded in the market.
This section shows that one can actually estimate the conditional and systematic dis-
aster concern measures from prices of options written on the individual asset together with
prices of options written on the market index. The covariations in the prices of these op-
tions allow one to estimate the required risk-neutral conditional probabilities without the
need for options written on the joint values of the asset and the market.
The estimation procedure consists of two steps. The rst step estimates the asset
disaster concern and the market disaster concern from the asset and market option prices,
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respectively, based on Ross (1976) and Breeden and Litzenberger (1978). In the second
step, I then estimate the conditional disaster concern of the asset given di¤erent market
states using the asset and market disaster concern estimates obtained in the rst step by
a constrained linear regression over time. Below I discuss each of these two steps in turn.
3.1 Estimating Disaster Concern
I start with the estimation of the asset disaster concern Dis and the market disaster
concern DisM from option prices based on Ross (1976) and Breeden and Litzenberger
(1978), assuming that both the asset and the market index are traded in the options
market. Since the asset and market disaster concern can be estimated in the same manner,
below I drop the superscript for brevity.
Ross (1976) and Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) show that given the prices of Eu-
ropean options with a continuous range of strike prices covering all possible values of the
underlying asset at maturity, the risk-neutral probability distribution of the assets value
at maturity can be estimated in a model-free manner. At any time t, consider a European
put option that matures at time T: Let St represent the current price of the underlying
asset, and let ST be the price of the asset at maturity. Denote the strike price of the option
by K and the risk-free rate by rf : The price of the put option can then be expressed as a
function of the strike price:
Put (K) = e rf (T t)
Z 1
ST=0
(K   ST )+ dF (ST ) (5)
= e rf (T t)
Z K
ST=0
(K   ST ) dF (ST ) ; (6)
where F () is the risk-neutral cumulative distribution function (CDF) of ST evaluated at
time t: Di¤erentiating (6) with respect to the strike price obtains
@Put (K)
@K
= e rf (T t)F (K) :
Solving for F (K) leads to
F (K) = erf (T t)
@Put (K)
@K
:
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Evaluating F (K) at all possible values of K thus yields the risk-neutral distribution of the
asset price at maturity.1
Assume that an asset is in the disaster state whenever its return over a period of length
T   t falls below some disaster threshold r: Then, the disaster concern of the asset is given
by
Dis = Q (r  r) : (7)
Fixing the current price of the asset St and assuming that the expected dividend yield paid
by the asset from t to T is equal to d; there is a one-to-one mapping between the asset
return and the asset price at maturity through
ST = St (1 + r   d) :
As a result, (7) is equivalent to
Dis = Q
 
ST  ST

= F
 
ST

; (8)
where
ST = St (1 + r   d) : (9)
Evaluating (8) then yields the disaster concern of the asset.
Two technical issues entail further discussions. First, evaluating (8) requires di¤erenti-
ating the option price with respect to the strike price at the disaster threshold. Given the
di¢ culty of obtaining a closed-form expression for this derivative, I estimate it by linear
approximation as
F
 
ST
  erf (T t)Put   S+T   Put   S T S+T   S T ;
where S T = ST   $0:01 and S+T = ST + $0:01:
The second issue has to do with obtaining European option prices with the required time
to maturity T   t and strike prices around the disaster threshold. In practice, option prices
are available only at discrete maturities and strikes. Additionally, while most indices are
1One could alternatively estimate F () based on European call option prices. By the put-call parity,
theoretically the estimation results based on call and put options should be identical. Empirically, however,
out-of-the-money options are more liquid than in-the-money options and hence have more accurate prices.
To estimate disaster concern, I need to focus on options with very low strike prices. I thus rely on put
options for my estimation, which are out of the money around the disaster thresholds.
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represented by European options, individual stock options are generally American options.
To obtain the European option prices with the required time to maturity and strike prices,
I adopt a simple and commonly used approach of rst tting the implied volatility surface
by kernel smoothing and then recovering the European option prices based on the BS
model (Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973)) using tted implied volatilities. (See
the Appendix for detailed discussions.)
It is important to note that using the BS model here does not rely on the BS model
being the correct option pricing model. The OptionMetrics database provides the BS
implied volatility for all European options. For American options, OptionMetrics computes
the implied volatility based on the Cox-Ross-Rubinstein (CRR) model (Cox, Ross, and
Rubinstein (1979)), which converges to the BS implied volatility in the absence of early
exercise. For the deep-out-of-the-money put options examined in this paper, early exercise
is very unlikely, and hence the European prices should be very close to the American prices.
Because of these reasons, recovering European prices using the BS model simply inverts
the calculation of the BS implied volatility from observed option prices and hence does
not relying on the validity of the BS model. I choose to conduct kernel smoothing in the
implied volatility space rather than in the option price space, since it is more robust this
way and hence has become standard in the literature.
3.2 Estimating Conditional and Systematic Disaster Concern
I then proceed to estimate the conditional and systematic disaster concern of an asset with
respect to the market index. The essence here is to estimate the risk-neutral conditional
disaster probabilities of the asset given the disaster and non-disaster states of the market.
This might seem impossible without options written on the joint values of the asset and
market index. I now show that the time variations of the asset disaster concern and the
market disaster concern together make the estimation possible.
The key of this estimation lies with the total probability formula (2). Rearranging
(2) yields (4), which shows that the systematic disaster concern SysDisi measures the
sensitivity of the asset disaster concern Disi to the market disaster concern DisM . Thus,
a natural idea is to estimate SysDisi using a time-series regression. Specically, if the
time series of Disi and DisM are available, one could estimate SysDisi as the slope
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coe¢ cient from regressing Disi on DisM over time. While this idea might be simple, an
implicit restriction is that SysDisi is a bounded variable. In fact, the boundedness of
SysDisi stems from the boundedness of ConDisi
 
DM

and ConDisi
 
NM

; which are by
denition risk-neutral conditional probabilities and hence must take values between zero
and one. Unfortunately, running an unconstrained regression of Disi on DisM cannot
guarantee that this boundedness condition is satised.
To x this problem, I use a constrained linear regression. Since the boundedness con-
straint is on ConDisi
 
DM

and ConDisi
 
NM

; I need to estimate ConDisi
 
DM

and
ConDisi
 
NM

rst instead of estimating SysDisi directly. By (2), Disi is linear in DisM
and 1 DisM through coe¢ cients ConDisi  DM and ConDisi  NM : Therefore, if I run
a time-series regression of Disi on DisM and 1   DisM without the constant term, the
resulting slope coe¢ cients would be estimates of ConDisi
 
DM

and ConDisi
 
NM

: To
make sure that these estimates are valid risk-neutral conditional probabilities, I require that
they must be bounded between zero and one. Formally, I conduct the following constrained
linear regression over time:
Disit = b
i
1Dis
M
t + b
i
2
 
1 DisMt

+ "it; (10)
s:t:
0  bi1; bi2  1:
The estimated bi1 and b
i
2 will be the conditional disaster concern variables ConDis
i
 
DM

and ConDisi
 
NM

; respectively, and their di¤erence immediately gives the systematic
disaster concern SysDisi.
It is worth mentioning that an implicit assumption needed in the above estimation is
that the conditional and systematic disaster concern measures stay xed throughout the
estimation period. This assumption is indeed not as restrictive as it appears. In practice,
one can always allow time variations in these measures using a rolling-window approach,
which is similar to how the CAPM beta is estimated in the literature. I will discuss this
in greater detail in the following section.
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4 Empirical Estimation and Results
In this section, I estimate the conditional and systematic disaster concern variables for a
large set of stocks and explore their empirical properties. I investigate their performance
in predicting stock-level disasters and stock returns in di¤erent market states. I then
construct a trading strategy based on the systematic disaster concern measure and explore
the source of the trading prot. I also examine the relation between systematic disaster
concern and a variety of stock and rm characteristics.
Since most variables in this paper are stock-specic, below I will often drop the asset
superscript i when no confusion is caused, but I will keep the market superscript for
clarity. For example, Dis without a superscript represents the disaster concern of a stock,
and DisM represents the market disaster concern.
4.1 Data and Estimation
The sample period is from January 1996 to December 2015. My main source of data is
the OptionMetrics database, which contains option prices along with information on prices
and dividend payments of the underlying securities. I choose the S&P 500 index as the
proxy for the market index. This index has actively traded options covering a wide range
of moneyness and time to maturity levels. I take all common stocks in OptionMetrics as
candidates for the individual asset with further ltering criteria to be described below. In
addition, I also collect stock return data from CRSP and rm fundamentals information
from Compustat.
In order to estimate the disaster concern variables, I need to dene appropriate disaster
thresholds for the market index and individual stocks. I focus on monthly returns of the
S&P 500 index and all stocks, and thus the associated disaster concern variables can be
inferred from prices of options maturing in one month (30 days). I dene the disaster
threshold as a monthly return of -0.1 for the S&P 500 index and -0.25 for all individual
stocks. In other words, the market is considered to be in the disaster state if it loses more
than 10% of its value within one month, and an individual stock is considered to be in the
disaster state if it loses more than 25% of its value within one month. Given these disaster
thresholds, the correspondingly dened disaster events occurred with historical frequencies
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around 2% for both the S&P 500 index and the group of sample stocks. The fact that the
market index has a higher (less negative) disaster threshold than the stocks reects that
the market is less volatile than individual assets.
For the S&P 500 index and the stocks, I estimate their disaster concern on a daily basis
according to (8). To maintain the accuracy of my estimation, I focus on stocks actively
traded on the option market using the following ltering criteria. For each date, I compute
the disaster concern of a stock only if (1) there are at least twenty di¤erent option contracts
written on the stock with implied volatility available, (2) the lowest moneyness level (ratio
of strike price to current stock price) of available option contracts written on the stock
is no higher than 0.9, and (3) the shortest (longest) time to maturity of available option
contracts written on the stock is no longer (shorter) than one month.
When estimating the disaster concern, I also need the expected dividend yield over
the upcoming one-month period (see (9)). The expected dividend yield paid by the S&P
500 index is directly provided in OptionMetrics. For the individual stocks, I assume that
investors accurately predict future regular dividend payments and thus estimate the ex-
pected dividend yield as the ratio of the total regular dividends paid by the stock over the
next month to the current stock price.
Having the disaster concern of the S&P 500 index and all stocks, I then estimate
the conditional and systematic disaster concern of each stock by the constrained linear
regression (10). At the end of each month, I perform estimation for each stock based on
daily disaster concern estimates from the most recent twelve-month window (250 trading
days), provided that the disaster concern estimate is available for the stock on at least 200
days during the estimation window. This allows for considerable time variations in the
conditional and systematic disaster concern variables, as will be shown below. Since twelve
months are needed for each estimation, I obtain monthly estimates of the conditional and
systematic disaster concern variables from December 1996 through December 2015. The
number of stocks left in my sample in each month ranges from 287 to 2770, with nearly
70% of all months having more than 1000 stocks.
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 plots the market disaster concern along with the cross-sectional average stock
disaster concern. The two variables tend to move in tandem with each other, and both
exhibit wide uctuations over time. In particular, there are two periods of substantial
increase in the disaster concern of both the market index and individual stocks. The rst
one is the 19982002 period, corresponding to the Internet bubble and the subsequent
bubble bursting, and the second one is the 20082011 period, corresponding to the recent
nancial crisis and the subsequent recession.
Figure 2 plots the cross-section average conditional disaster concern of stocks given
the disaster and non-disaster market states, respectively. The average conditional disaster
concern is always higher given disaster markets relative to non-disaster markets, meaning
that investors are on average more concerned about future stock disasters if the market
will have a disaster in the future than if not. Furthermore, while the average conditional
disaster concern given non-disaster markets does not vary much over time, the average
conditional disaster concern given disaster markets exhibits signicant time variations,
with peaks around the crisis periods.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the disaster concern variables. Panel A shows
that the market disaster concern (DisM ), estimated based on option prices of the S&P 500
index, has a mean value of 0.0509, indicating that investors expect a market-wide disaster
to happen with a risk-neutral probability of 5% on average. The median of DisM is 0.0389,
and the standard deviation is 0.0444. The minimum and maximum are 0.0008 and 0.3025,
respectively, meaning that the market disaster concern is considered close to zero during
the safest time but as high as 30% during the riskiest time.
Panel B reports summary statistics for stock-level variables. For each of these variables,
I rst compute the average value for each stock over time, and then report the cross-
sectional summary statistics of these stock averages. The cross-sectional mean of the stock
disaster concern (Dis) is 0.0873, indicating that an average rm is expected to experience
a disaster with a risk-neutral probability of around 9%. The median is 0.0661, and the
standard deviation is 0.0678. The minimum and maximum are 0 and 0.7583, respectively,
highlighting the wide cross-sectional variations in the disaster concern of di¤erent stocks.
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The conditional disaster concern variables have very di¤erent statistics depending on the
state of the market. Given disaster markets, the conditional disaster concern (ConDis
 
DM

)
has a mean value of 0.3718, implying that if the market will be in the disaster state, an
average rm is expected to experience a disaster with a risk-neutral probability of 37%.
The median is 0.3251, and the standard deviation is 0.2419. The minimum and maximum
are 0 and 1, respectively. This means that some rms are considered to have a zero prob-
ability of disaster even if the market itself will experience a disaster, whereas some other
rms are expected to have a disaster for sure if a market-wide occurs.
In comparison, given non-disaster markets, the conditional disaster concern ConDis
 
NM

has a much lower cross-sectional mean of 0.0519. This implies that rms are considered
much less likely to have a disaster if the market will not have a disaster than if it will.
The median value is 0.0358. The standard deviation is 0.0488, also much lower than that
of ConDis
 
DM

; meaning that conditional on future non-disaster markets, rms are con-
sidered less heterogeneous in terms of how likely a disaster would happen. The minimum
of ConDis
 
NM

is 0, and the maximum is 0.3476.
The systematic disaster concern (SysDis) has a mean of 0.3200, indicating that an
average rm is considered more likely to experience a disaster in disaster markets than
in non-disaster markets by a risk-neutral probability of 32%. The standard deviation
is 0.2295, which is mostly driven by the cross-sectional heterogeneity in ConDis
 
DM

:
Over 90% of all stocks have positive SysDis estimates on average, as suggested by a 10th
quantile of 0.0626. The cross-sectional minimum of SysDis is a negative value of -0.3438,
meaning that some rms are considered more likely to experience a disaster if the market
will perform normally relative to if the market will have a disaster. The cross-sectional
maximum of SysDis is 1, which can only happen when the conditional disaster concern is
1 given disaster markets and 0 given non-disaster markets.
Panel B of Table 1 also reports summary statistics for the CAPM beta (Beta) of the
stocks. At the end of each month, I estimate Beta for each stock by regressing daily excess
stock returns on daily excess market returns over the preceding twelve-month window.
For consistency, I continue to use the S&P 500 as the market index for the estimation
of Beta. Across my sample stocks, Beta has a mean of 1.1210, a median of 1.0713, and
a standard deviation of 0.4258. All stocks have positive betas on average, with a cross-
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sectional minimum of 0.0248 and a cross-sectional maximum of 4.4703.
At the end of each month, I also estimate the market disaster concern beta (DisBeta)
for each stock, which is obtained by regressing daily stock returns on daily estimates
of DisM over the preceding twelve-month window. Intuitively, DisBeta measures the
sensitivity of the stock return to the market disaster concern, which is similar to the
approach commonly used in the literature to gauge the systematic disaster risk of individual
stocks. Panel B of Table 1 shows that most stocks have negative DisBeta on average,
suggesting that stocks tend to have lower returns as the market disaster concern rises.
In fact, a more negative value of DisBeta indicates a larger decrease in the stock return
when the market disaster concern rises, representing higher systematic disaster risk. The
cross-sectional mean and median of DisBeta are -0.1509 and -0.1301, respectively, and the
cross-sectional standard deviation is 0.1129.
Table 2 reports the pairwise correlations across the stock-level variables. It shows that
ConDis
 
DM

and ConDis
 
NM

have a mild positive correlation of 0.1308. Also, SysDis
has a very high correlation of 0.9943 with ConDis
 
DM

and only a weak correlation of
0.0242 with ConDis
 
NM

: This suggests that the variations in SysDis are mostly driven
by ConDis
 
DM

: In addition, SysDis is positively correlated with Beta with a correlation
coe¢ cient of 0.4003. Somewhat surprisingly, SysDis and DisBeta have a very small
negative correlation of -0.0693. This suggests that these two measures are likely to capture
di¤erent aspects of individual stocksexposure to systematic disaster risk. Furthermore,
DisBeta is negatively correlated with Beta with a correlation coe¢ cient of -0.3707.
The constrained regression estimation approach introduced in Section 3.2 implies that
the market disaster concern is a factor driving the time variations in the disaster concern
of individual stocks. It is then curious to ask what proportions of the time variations in
individual stock disaster concern can be explained by variations in the market disaster
concern. To answer this question, I compute the R-squared from the constrained linear
regression (10) as
R2 = 1  V ar (")
V ar (Dis)
;
where V ar (Dis) is the variance of the disaster concern of a stock over the estimation
window, and V ar (") is the variance of the regression residuals. Intuitively, R2 measures
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the proportion of the total time variations in the stock disaster concern that is attributable
to changes in the market disaster concern.
Figure 3 plots the cross-sectional average R-squared over time. The gure shows that
the average R-squared varies dramatically over the sample period. It tends to increase
during crises. In particular, during the 20082009 nancial crisis, the average R-squared
rises sharply above 0.5, indicating that more than half of the time variations in individual
stock disaster concern over this period is driven by changes in the market disaster concern.
4.3 Two Examples: Microsoft and Bank of America
To provide more intuitions about the systematic disaster concern of di¤erent stocks, I ex-
amine Microsoft and BOA as two examples. We have seen in Figure 1 that there are two
periods of substantial increases in the market disaster concern throughout my sample, with
the 19982002 period driven by the Internet bubble and the 20082011 period correspond-
ing to the nancial crisis. Since Microsoft is a technology rm and BOA is a nancial rm,
one would wonder if these two rms respond di¤erently over these two periods.
To address this question, I rst plot the disaster concern of Microsoft and BOA over
time in Figure 4. Both stocks exhibit dramatic increases in the disaster concern during
both the 19982002 and the 20082011 periods, reecting that the disaster concern of both
stocks responds positively to increases in the market disaster concern. Interestingly, in the
top gure the increase in the disaster concern of Microsoft is more pronounced during the
rst period. In contrast, the bottom gure shows that the increase in the disaster concern
of BOA is more pronounced during the second period. This suggests that the disaster
concern of Microsoft appears to be more sensitive to the increase in the market disaster
concern driven by the Internet bubble, whereas the disaster concern of BOA appears to be
more sensitive to the increase in the market disaster concern driven by the nancial crisis.
I further plot the systematic disaster concern of these two stocks over time in Figure 5,
which directly measures the sensitivity of individual stock disaster concern to the market
disaster concern. As expected, in the top gure the systematic disaster concern of Microsoft
rises sharply to around 0.8 during the Internet bubble, compared to a much milder rise
during the nancial crisis. In contrast, the bottom gure shows that the systematic disaster
concern of BOA shoots up to 1 during the nancial crisis, much higher than its peak level
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during the Internet bubble. These ndings are consistent with intuitions and serve as
supportive evidence for the validity of my estimation.
4.4 Condition Disaster Concern and Future Stock Disasters
The conditional disaster concern reects investorsexpectation on how likely a stock-level
disaster is to happen in di¤erent market states. It is interesting to ask whether the esti-
mated conditional disaster concern variables provide information on the future occurrence
of stock disasters in the corresponding state of the market.
At any time t, two conditional disaster concern variables, ConDisit
 
DM

and ConDisit
 
NM

;
can be estimated for each stock i corresponding to future disaster and non-disaster markets,
respectively. Eventually, only one of these two market states realizes, and the conditional
disaster concern given the subsequently realized market state should be more relevant to
the prediction of future stock disasters. Based on this idea, I denote by ConDisit
 
rMt+1

the
conditional disaster concern of stock i estimated at the end of month t given the realized
state of the market in month t+ 1; i.e.,
ConDisit
 
rMt+1

=

ConDisit
 
DM

; if rMt+1   0:1
ConDisit
 
NM

; if rMt+1 >  0:1
:
I further dene a dummy variable DisDit for a realized disaster of stock i in month t; i.e.,
DisDit =

1; if rit   0:25
0; if rit >  0:25
:
If my conditional disaster concern estimates are informative, ConDisit
 
rMt+1

should posi-
tively predicts DisDit+1:
Table 3 compares ConDisit
 
rMt+1

with DisDit+1: The average value of ConDis
i
t
 
rMt+1

across all stocks over the entire sample is 0.0328, meaning that on average investors ex-
pect a stock-level disaster to occur with a risk-neutral probability of 3% conditional on
the subsequently realized state of the market. The average value of DisDit+1 is 0.0229,
indicating that the frequency of a realized stock disaster is about 2% in my sample. The
table also reports results for subsamples with realized disaster and non-disaster markets
separately. For the 224 months without market disasters (rMt+1 >  0:1), the average value
of ConDisit
 
rMt+1

is 0.0272, and the average value of DisDit+1 is 0.0195. For the remaining
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4 months with realized market disasters (rMt+1   0:1), the average of ConDisit
 
rMt+1

is
0.3391, and the average of DisDit+1 is 0.2470. This indicates that both the conditional
disaster concern and the realized disaster frequency of stocks are higher given disaster
markets relative to non-disaster markets. Notice that since ConDisit
 
rMt+1

is dened un-
der the risk-neutral measure and DisDit+1 reects the frequency of stock disasters under
the physical measure, the di¤erence in the average value between these two variables may
result from both biased expectation and risk aversion of investors.
To see if stocks with higher ConDisit
 
rMt+1

are more likely to experience disasters, for
each month t; I run a cross-sectional regression of DisDit+1 on ConDis
i
t
 
rMt+1

; i.e.,
DisDit+1 = 0;t+1 + 1;t+1ConDist
 
rMt+1

+ t+1:
If ConDisit
 
rMt+1

contains information on the realization of stock disasters, 1;t+1 should
be positive.
The last column of Table 3 reports the time average of the estimated 1;t+1. For the
entire sample, 1;t+1 has a positive mean value of 0.5781, which is signicant at the 1% level
based on the Newey-West standard error.2 This means that on average, if ConDisit
 
rMt+1

increases from 0 to 1, the probability of a stock disaster increases by 58%. For the sub-
samples with realized disaster and non-disaster markets, the average values of 1;t+1 are
0.3066 and 0.5830, respectively, both strongly signicant. This implies that increasing
ConDisit
 
rMt+1

from 0 to 1 raises the probability of a stock disaster by 31% and 58% given
realized disaster and non-disaster markets, respectively.
It is worth taking a closer look at each of the 4 months with realized market disasters.
These 4 months are August 1998, September 2002, October 2008 and February 2009, with
the monthly market return being -0.1431, -0.1090, -0.1670, and -0.1036, respectively. The
lower panel of Table 3 shows that the estimated 1;t+1 is signicantly positive in each of
these months, with values ranging from 0.2050 to 0.4271.
2The Newey-West standard error is used to account for potential autocorrelation of the error term.
Following Stock and Watson (2011) page 599, I choose the number of lags using the rule of thumb:
L = 0:75T 1=3;
where L is the number of lags and T is the number of observations in the time series. There are 228 months
in my sample, which leads to the use of 5 lags.
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Overall, these results show that my estimated conditional disaster concern variables
indeed provide useful information on the future occurrence of stock disasters in the corre-
sponding state of the market.
4.5 Systematic Disaster Concern and Expected Stock Returns
I now explore the relation between systematic disaster concern and the expected stock
return. I start with a portfolio sorting approach. At the end of each month, I sort all
stocks into ve quintile portfolios by their systematic disaster concern estimates, and then
calculate the equal-weighted return of each portfolio over the next month. Table 4 reports
the average returns of the ve SysDis-sorted portfolios over time. From the lowest-SysDis
portfolio to the highest-SysDis portfolio, the average returns of the ve portfolios over the
entire sample are 0.0078, 0.0096, 0.0104, 0.0085 and 0.0072, respectively, which exhibit a
hump shape. Portfolios with the lowest and highest systematic disaster concern tend to
have lower returns on average than portfolios in the middle. The return di¤erence between
the bottom and top portfolios is not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
To nd out what drives the hump-shaped relation, I then calculate the average returns
of the ve SysDis-sorted portfolios over months with positive and negative market returns
separately. For the 140 months with positive market returns, the average returns of the ve
portfolios from the lowest SysDis to the highest SysDis are 0.0330, 0.0359, 0.0413, 0.0460,
and 0.0531, respectively, which are monotonically increasing. The average return di¤erence
between the bottom and the top portfolios is -0.0201, and this di¤erence is signicant at
the 1% level. This suggests that stocks with high systematic disaster concern outperform
stocks with low systematic disaster concern on average when the market overall performs
well. In particular, going long in stocks with the highest SysDis and shorting stocks with
the lowest SysDis results in an average monthly return of 2.01% conditional on the market
delivering positive returns.
I then repeat the analysis for the 88 months with negative market returns. The average
returns of the ve portfolios from the lowest SysDis to the highest SysDis are -0.0323,
-0.0324, -0.0387, -0.0511, and -0.0657, respectively, which are monotonically decreasing.
The average return di¤erence between the bottom and the top portfolios is 0.0334, also
signicant at the 1% level. This shows that stocks with high systematic disaster concern
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underperform stocks with low systematic disaster concern on average when the market
overall performs poorly. In particular, going long in stocks with the lowest SysDis and
shorting stocks with the highest SysDis results in an average monthly return of 3.34%
conditional on the market return being negative.
The opposite relations between the systematic disaster concern and the expected portfo-
lio return in good and bad markets are intuitive. The systematic disaster concern describes
investorsexpectations on the incremental likelihood of future stock disasters if there will
be a market-wide disaster relative to if there will not. It has been shown in Section 4.4
that these expectations are indeed informative on the future occurrence of stock disasters in
di¤erent states of the market. Given this, if a market-wide disaster happens in the future,
one would expect stocks with high systematic disaster concern to be more heavily a¤ected
and hence deliver lower returns than other stocks. In addition, given the continuous na-
ture of equity returns, negative market returns above the disaster threshold, despite being
dened as in the non-disaster state, also represent poor performance of the market. As
a result, stocks with high systematic disaster concern may underperform in this situation
as well. In contrast, when the market performs well, stocks with high systematic disaster
concern should outperform other stocks. Otherwise, they would be dominated by stocks
with low systematic disaster concern in all market states, and thus no investors would
be willing to hold them. This explains the positive relation between systematic disaster
concern and the expected portfolio return conditional on the future market return being
positive. Overall, the opposite patterns in good and bad markets together give rise to the
hump-shaped relation between systematic disaster concern and expected portfolio returns
in the full sample.
The analysis so far is at the portfolio level. To further examine the relation between
systematic disaster concern and the expected stock return in di¤erent market states, I use
a regression approach at the stock level. In each month, I cross-sectionally regress the
monthly stock return on the systematic disaster concern estimated as of the end of the
previous month, controlling for lagged values of the CAPM beta (Beta) and the market
disaster concern beta (DisBeta), i.e.,
rit+1 = 0;t+1 + 1;t+1SysDis
i
t + 2;t+1Beta
i
t + 3;t+1DisBeta
i
t +  
i
t+1:
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The reason for including Beta in the regression is because it is positively correlated with
SysDis: Stocks with large Beta are cyclical in the sense that they tend to outperform other
stocks in good markets and underperform other stocks in bad markets. I thus wonder if the
relation between the systematic disaster concern and the expected stock return in di¤erent
market states is driven by Beta. I also control for DisBeta in the regression to disentangle
the e¤ects of SysDis and DisBeta on the expected stock return.
Table 5 shows the average values of the regression coe¢ cients over time. I start by
running the regression without controlling for Beta and DisBeta: Over the full sample,
the average slope coe¢ cient on SysDis is not signicantly di¤erent from zero, which is
expected given the hump-shaped relation found with the portfolio sorting approach. I
then split the full sample into subsamples with positive and negative monthly market
returns. For the months with positive market returns, the average coe¢ cient on SysDis
is signicant positive at the 1% level, implying that stocks with higher systematic disaster
concern tend to deliver higher returns in good markets. On the other hand, for the months
with negative market returns, the average coe¢ cient on SysDis is negative and signicant
at the 1% level, implying that stocks with higher systematic disaster concern tend to deliver
lower returns in bad markets. These nding are consistent with the results from portfolios
sorting
I then include Beta and DisBeta in the regression. For the full sample, including
the controls does not change the result much. The average coe¢ cient on SysDis remains
insignicant. In fact, neither Beta nor DisBeta seems to have a signicant e¤ect on the
expected stock return over the entire sample. For the months with positive market returns,
Beta has a positive coe¢ cient and DisBeta has a negative coe¢ cient, and both variables
are statistically signicant. This means that stocks with higher Beta and lower DisBeta
tend to deliver higher returns if the market performs well. With these variables being
controlled for, SysDis is still positive and signicant at the 10% level. This indicates that
the positive relation between SysDis and the expected stock return in good markets is
not fully driven by Beta and DisBeta: When I focus on months with negative market
returns, I now nd a negative coe¢ cient on Beta and a positive coe¢ cient on DisBeta;
meaning that stocks with lower Beta and higher DisBeta tend to perform better in bad
markets. Interestingly, the coe¢ cient on SysDis remain negative and signicant at the
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1% level. This shows that the negative relation between SysDis and the expected stock
return remains strong even when Beta and DisBeta are controlled for.
Overall, my results show that the relation between systematic disaster concern and the
expected stock return depends on the market state. Higher systematic disaster concern
predicts higher stock returns in good markets and lower stock returns in bad markets.
These e¤ects are not driven by the CAPM beta or the market disaster concern beta.
4.6 A Trading Strategy
Section 4.5 shows that stocks with the lowest and the highest systematic disaster concern
have lower expected returns than stocks in the middle. This allows me to construct a
trading strategy by going long in stocks with middle levels of systematic disaster concern
and shorting a combination of stocks with the lowest and the highest systematic disaster
concern.
Let rpjt+1 represent the equal-weighted return of the jth quintile portfolio sorted by
SysDist over month t+ 1; where j = 1; 2; : : : 5: The trading return from going long in the
middle quintile and shorting a combination of x in the bottom quintile and 1   x in the
top quintile is
rTradet+1 = r
p3
t+1   xrp1t+1   (1  x) rp5t+1; (11)
where x takes values from 0 to 1.3 In particular, x = 0 corresponds to going long in the
mid-SysDis portfolio and shorting the highest-SysDis portfolio, and x = 1 corresponds to
going long in the mid-SysDis portfolio and shorting the lowest-SysDis portfolio. A larger
x represents shorting a larger proportion of stocks with the lowest systematic disaster
concern.
Table 6 reports the average returns from the trading strategy with x varying from 0 to
1. The average monthly trading return is positive for all values of x: It slowly decreases
from 0.32% when x = 0 to 0.26% when x = 1; which is a result of the fact that the lowest-
SysDis portfolio has a slightly higher average return than the highest-SysDis portfolio
during the sample period. Statistically, x = 0:7 gives rise to the most signicant average
3The trading strategy proposed here is a long-short strategy that requires zero net investment. The
trading return (11) represents the prot earned for each one dollar engaged in the long-short strategy. One
can easily scale up or down the trading prot while maintaining zero net investment.
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trading return of 0.28%, corresponding to a long position in the mid-SysDis portfolio and
a short position consisting of 70% in the lowest-SysDis portfolio and 30% in the highest-
SysDis portfolio. The statistical signicance results from reduced trading volatility from
shorting a non-zero proportion of both the lowest-SysDis and the highest-SysDis stocks,
since these two groups of stocks tend to have o¤setting returns.
To understand the source of the positive average trading returns, I calculate the abnor-
mal returns (i.e., risk-adjusted alphas) with respect to a number of popular factor models.
I start with the CAPM model, in which the market factor is the only source of systematic
risk. The CAPM alpha ranges from 0.65% when x = 0 to 0.15% when x = 1; and it is
signicantly positive at the 5% level for values of x between 0 and 0.7. This indicates that
the positive average trading returns are not attributable to the exposure of my trading
strategy to the market risk. I next estimate the alpha using the Fama and French (1993)
three factors (market, size, and value) plus a fourth momentum factor (Carhart (1997)).
The four-factor alpha ranges from 0.41% when x = 0 to 0.25% when x = 1: Indeed, for
almost all values of x; the four-factor alpha is weakly higher than the corresponding average
trading return and statistically signicant. Again, my trading strategy generates positive
abnormal returns that cannot be explained by the market, size, value, and momentum
factors. Finally, I estimate the risk-adjusted alpha using the Fama and French (2016) ve
factors (market, size, value, protability, and investment) plus the momentum factor. Now
the abnormal return disappears for all values of x: This suggests that the positive average
trading returns are mostly driven by the protability and investment factors.4
Finally, Table 7 reports the slope coe¢ cients and the adjusted R-squared from re-
gressing the trading returns on the Fama-French ve factors and the momentum factor
for di¤erent values of x: Each factor has a signicant coe¢ cient for at least some values
of x: The adjusted R-squared ranges from 0.6991 when x = 0 to 0.3309 when x = 1:
Hence, the six factors together explain 33%70% of the variations in the returns from the
SysDis-based trading strategy.
4 Including the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor does not change the results. I thus omit it
for brevity.
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4.7 Systematic Disaster Concern and Firm Characteristics
This section examines the relation between systematic disaster concern and various stock
and rm characteristics. I focus on the following characteristics:
 CAPM beta (Beta): the sensitivity of the stock return to the market return (proxied
by the S&P 500 return);
 Market disaster concern beta (DisBeta): the sensitivity of the stock return to the
market disaster concern (DisM );
 Idiosyncratic volatility (Idio): the annualized standard deviation of the residuals
from the CAPM regression;
 Illiquidity (Illiq): the average of daily ratios of the absolute stock return to the dollar
trading volume, scaled by the cross-sectional mean (following Amihud (2002));
 Firm size (Size): the log market capitalization;
 Book-to-market ratio (B2M): the ratio of the book value of equity to the market
value of equity;
 Return on equity (ROE): the ratio of income before extraordinary items to the book
value of equity;
 Investment (Inv): the proportional quarterly change in total assets;
 Leverage (Lever): the ratio of total liabilities to total assets.
At the end of each month, I estimate Beta; DisBeta; Idio and Illiq using stock returns
and other information at the daily frequency from the most recent twelve-month window.
This is consistent with the window period used to estimate the systematic disaster concern
SysDis. For Size; B2M; ROE; Inv and Lever; I use the most recent values of these
variables available as of the end of each month. To examine the relation between system-
atic disaster concern and the characteristics, in each month I again sort stocks into ve
quintile portfolios based on SysDis, and I compute the equal-weighted average value of
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each characteristic for the ve portfolios. I use values of SysDis and the characteristics
in the same month instead of looking at the lead-lag relation, since the focus here is not
about prediction.
Table 8 reports the time averages of SysDis and the characteristics for the SysDis-
sorted portfolios. The average values of SysDis for the ve portfolios are -0.0103, 0.0917,
0.2121, 0.4016 and 0.7433, respectively. The average portfolio characteristics exhibit some
nonlinearity with respect to SysDis, and a closer look reveals that the nonlinearity comes
solely from the lowest-SysDis portfolio. Ignoring the lowest-SysDis portfolio, I nd that
portfolios with higher SysDis are associated with larger CAPM betas, more negative
market disaster concern betas, higher idiosyncratic volatility and illiquidity, smaller market
capitalization, lower returns on equity and leverage, and higher book-to-market ratios
and investment. On the other hand, the lowest-SysDis portfolio has the highest level
of illiquidity of all ve portfolios, and it also tends to contain stocks with small market
capitalization and below-average CAPM betas. Such stocks may be less likely to draw
attention from investors and hence less actively traded. This in turn may cause the stock
disaster concern to be less sensitive to the market disaster concern, thus giving rise to very
low levels of systematic disaster concern.
5 Conclusion
The existing literature on the option-implied disaster concern is restricted to the aggregate
market. This paper extends the literature by studying individual assetsdisaster concern
and its systematic variations with the market. I propose new measures of the conditional
and systematic disaster concern of an asset with respect to the market index, which can
be estimated based on the comovement of the option-implied disaster concern between
the asset and the market index. These measures have intuitive interpretations in terms of
the risk-neutral conditional disaster probabilities, reecting investorsexpectations on the
asset disaster risk given di¤erent future states of the market. Using the S&P 500 index
as the proxy for the market index, I empirically estimate the conditional and systematic
disaster concern measures for a large set of common stocks. I show that the estimated
conditional and systematic disaster concern variables vary widely both in the time series
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and in the cross section and that they strongly predict stock-level disasters and stock
returns in di¤erent market states. These ndings indicate that the comovement of option
prices between stocks and the market index contains forward-looking information on their
joint tail distributions.
The idea of using the covariations in the option prices of di¤erent securities to infer
their joint return behavior extends far beyond the study of disaster risk. By dening richer
state spaces, one could potentially estimate the entire risk-neutral joint return distrib-
utions of di¤erent securities from option prices. In addition, the constrained regression
approach motivated by the total probability formula is nonparametric and does not rely on
an assumed functional form of the generating process of asset returns. Hence, it may help
uncover potential nonlinearity in the structure of asset returns with respect to systematic
factors. All of these could have important implications on theoretical and empirical work
in asset pricing, which I leave for future research.
Appendix: Estimating European Option Prices
As discussed in Section 3.1, in order to estimate the disaster concern of an asset, one needs
European put option prices for some specic time to maturity and strike prices around
the disaster threshold, which are usually not directly observed in the market. To obtain
these option prices, I adopt the following approach from the literature (e.g., Shimko (1993),
Malz (1997), and Figlewski (2010)). On any given date, I start with the implied volatilities
provided in OptionMetrics of all traded options written on the asset of interest, and t
the implied volatility surface across di¤erent strike prices and maturities. Then, I plug
the tted implied volatilities at the required maturity and strike prices into the BS pricing
formula to estimate the corresponding European option prices.
I t the implied volatility surface by kernel smoothing, following the procedure used
by OptionMetrics. For each date, I index all traded option contracts written on the asset
by h = 1; 2; : : : ;H: For each option contract h, let h represent the implied volatility,
and let V h be the option vega (which measures the sensitivity of the option price to the
volatility). Denote by mnh = Xh=St the moneyness of the option, by mth the time to
maturity in years, and by cph a dummy variable that equals 0 for call options and 1 for
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put options. Then, for any arbitrary moneyness mn (within the range of moneyness for
traded options), time to maturity mt (within the range of maturity for traded options),
and call-put indicator cp (cp = 1 for all my analyses since I use put option prices for
disaster concern estimation), the tted volatility can be computed as
^ (mn;mt; cp) =
PH
h=1 V
hh	
 
mn  mnh;mt  mth; cp   cphPH
h=1 V
h	 (mn  mnh;mt  mth; cp   cph) ; (12)
where the kernel function 	 is given by
	 (x; y; z) =
1p
2
exp

  x
2
2c1
  y
2
2c2
  z
2
2c3

:
I naively choose c1 = c2 = c3 = 0:001: I check to make sure that these parameter values
yield reasonable tting.
The idea of the kernel smoothing procedure is intuitive. For any (mn;mt; cp), I
estimate the associated implied volatility as the weighted average of the implied volatilities
of all traded options, where those with moneyness, time to maturity, and call-put indicator
close to (mn;mt; cp) are assigned higher weights than those far away. In addition, since I
eventually need to compute the European option prices from the tted implied volatilities,
I also assign higher weights to traded options whose prices have higher sensitivity to the
volatility (higher vega).
It is worth mentioning that the kernel smoothing formula (12) applies only for values
of mn and mt within the observed ranges of the corresponding parameters for traded
options. In order to estimate the disaster concern, I need European put option prices
(and hence the volatilities) around the disaster thresholds, and thus mn may lie below
the observed moneyness range of traded options. In this case, I assume that the implied
volatility outside the observed range is at and hence set mn equal to the lowest observed
moneyness of traded options.
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Figure 1: Market and Stock Disaster Concern
This gure plots the market disaster concern and the cross-sectional average stock disaster concern over time.
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Figure 2: Conditional Disaster Concern
This gure plots the cross-sectional average conditional disaster concern of stocks given disaster and non-disaster
markets over time.
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Figure 3: Estimation R-Squared
This gure plots the cross-sectional average R-squared from the conditional disaster concern estimation over
time.
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Figure 4: Disaster Concern of Microsoft and Bank of America
The top and bottom gures plot the disaster concern of Microsoft and Bank of America over time, respectively.
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Figure 5: Systematic Disaster Concern of Microsoft and Bank of America
The top and bottom gures plot the systematic disaster concern of Microsoft and Bank of America over time,
respectively.
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
Sy
st
em
at
ic
 D
is
as
te
r C
on
ce
rn
01jan1997 01jul2001 01jan2006 01jul2010 01jan2015
Date
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Sy
st
em
at
ic
 D
is
as
te
r C
on
ce
rn
01jan1997 01jul2001 01jan2006 01jul2010 01jan2015
Date
39
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A shows summary statistics for the market disaster concern (DisM ). Panel B shows summary statistics
for stock-level variables including the disaster concern (Dis); conditional disaster concern given disaster and non-
disaster markets (ConDis
 
DM

and ConDis
 
NM

); systematic disaster concern (SysDis); CAPM beta (Beta);
and market disaster concern beta (DisBeta): For each of the stock-level variables, I compute the average value for
each stock over time and report the cross-sectional summary statistics of these stock averages.
Panel A: Market Variables
Mean S.D. Min Q10 Median Q90 Max
DisM 0.0509 0.0444 0.0008 0.0092 0.0389 0.1088 0.3025
Panel B: Stock Variables
Mean S.D. Min Q10 Median Q90 Max
Dis 0.0873 0.0678 0 0.0266 0.0661 0.1827 0.7583
ConDis
 
DM

0.3718 0.2419 0 0.1027 0.3251 0.7217 1
ConDis
 
NM

0.0519 0.0488 0 0.0104 0.0358 0.1187 0.3476
SysDis 0.3200 0.2295 -0.3438 0.0626 0.2872 0.6384 1
Beta 1.1210 0.4258 0.0248 0.6445 1.0713 1.6277 4.4703
DisBeta -0.1509 0.1129 -0.9744 -0.2653 -0.1301 -0.0543 0.4804
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Table 2: Pairwise Correlations
This table reports pairwise correlations of stock-level variables including the disaster concern (Dis); conditional
disaster concern given disaster and non-disaster markets (ConDis
 
DM

and ConDis
 
NM

); systematic disaster
concern (SysDis); CAPM beta (Beta); the market disaster concern beta (DisBeta):
ConDis
 
DM

ConDis
 
NM

SysDis Beta DisBeta
ConDis
 
DM

1 0.1308 0.9943 0.4220 -0.0877
ConDis
 
NM

0.1308 1 0.0242 0.2340 -0.1782
SysDis 0.9943 0.0242 1 0.4003 -0.0693
Beta 0.4220 0.2340 0.4003 1 -0.3707
DisBeta -0.0877 -0.1782 -0.0693 -0.3707 1
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Table 3: Conditional Disaster Concern and Realized Stock Disasters
This table reports the average values of the estimated conditional disaster concern given the subsequently realized
state of the market (ConDist
 
rMt+1

) and the realized stock disaster dummy (DisDt+1) for the full sample as well
as for subsamples with realized disaster and non-disaster markets separately. The table also reports the time average
of the slope coe¢ cient (1;t+1) from cross-sectionally regressing DisDt+1 on ConDist
 
rMt+1

for each month. Also
shown in the table are results for each of the 4 months with realized market disasters The standard errors are
displayed in the parentheses below the corresponding estimates. For the full-sample t-test, I use the Newey-West
standard error with 5 lags to account for potential autocorrelation. Asterisks denote statistical signicance at the
1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
rMt+1 ConDist
 
rMt+1

DisDt+1 1;t+1
Full Sample 0.0328 0.0229 0.5781
(228 Months) (0.0728)***
Non-Disaster Markets >  0:1 0.0272 0.0195 0.5830
(224 Months) (0.0475)***
Disaster Markets   0:1 0.3991 0.2470 0.3066
(4 Months) (0.0471)***
Aug 1998 -0.1431 0.1591 0.3055 0.2050
(0.0943)**
Sep 2002 -0.1090 0.3936 0.0846 0.2685
(0.0400)***
Oct 2008 -0.1670 0.3694 0.4278 0.4271
(0.0484)***
Feb 2009 -0.1036 0.5653 0.1216 0.3260
(0.0433)***
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Table 4: Systematic Disaster Concern and Expected Portfolio Returns
This table reports the average monthly returns of portfolios sorted by the lagged value of systematic disaster
concern (SysDis) for the full sample as well as for subsamples with positive and negative market returns separately.
Also reported are the average return di¤erences between portfolios with the lowest and the highest SysDis. The
standard errors are displayed in the parentheses below the corresponding estimates. For the full-sample test, I use
the Newey-West standard error with 5 lags to account for potential autocorrelation. Asterisks denote statistical
signicance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
Portfolio by SysDis Low 2 3 4 High LowHigh
Full Sample 0.0078 0.0096 0.0104 0.0085 0.0072 0.0006
(228 Months) (0.0038)
Positive Market Return 0.0330 0.0359 0.0413 0.0460 0.0531 -0.0201
(140 Months) (0.0042)***
Negative Market Return -0.0323 -0.0324 -0.0387 -0.0511 -0.0657 0.0334
(88 Months) (0.0058)***
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Table 5: Systematic Disaster Concern and Expected Stock Returns
This table reports the average slope coe¢ cients from cross-sectionally regressing monthly stock returns on the
lagged values of the systematic disaster concern (SysDis), the CAPM beta (Beta); and the market disaster concern
beta (DisBeta) for the full sample (Panel A) as well as for subsamples with positive and negative market returns
separately (Panels B and C). The standard errors are displayed in the parentheses below the corresponding estimates.
For the full-sample tests, I use the Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags to account for potential autocorrelation.
Asterisks denote statistical signicance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
Panel A: Full Sample
SysDis -0.0017 -0.0014
(0.0054) (0.0031)
Beta -0.0007
(0.0032)
DisBeta -0.0204
(0.0207)
Constant 0.0088 0.0081
(0.0029)*** (0.0029)***
Panel B: Positive Market Return
SysDis 0.0261 0.0055
(0.0059)*** (0.0031)*
Beta 0.0168
(0.0037)***
DisBeta -0.0611
(0.0239)**
Constant 0.0317 0.0152
(0.0022)*** (0.0031)***
Panel C: Negative Market Return
SysDis -0.0459 -0.0125
(0.0076)*** (0.0039)***
Beta -0.0285
(0.0045)***
DisBeta 0.0444
(0.0241)*
Constant -0.0277 -0.0031
(0.0039)*** (0.0042)
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Table 6: Average Trading Returns and Risk-Adjusted Alphas
This table reports the average monthly returns from a trading strategy constructed based on the systematic
disaster concern (SysDis): The trading strategy involves going long in stocks in the mid-SysDis quintile and shorting
a combination of stocks with a proportion of x in the lowest-SysDis quintile and 1 x in the highest-SysDis quintile.
Also reported are the risk-adjusted alphas based on the CAPM model, the Fama-French three-factor model plus the
momentum factor, and the Fama-French ve-factor model plus the momentum factor. The Newey-West standard
errors with 5 lags are displayed in the parentheses below the corresponding estimates. Asterisks denote statistical
signicance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
x = 0 x = 0:1 x = 0:2 x = 0:3 x = 0:4 x = 0:5
Average Return 0.0032 0.0031 0.0031 0.0030 0.0030 0.0029
(0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0017)*
Alpha (CAPM) 0.0065 0.0060 0.0055 0.0050 0.0045 0.0040
(0.0027)** (0.0024)** (0.0022)** (0.0020)** (0.0018)** (0.0017)**
Alpha (FF3F+UMD) 0.0041 0.0039 0.0038 0.0036 0.0035 0.0033
(0.0019)** (0.0018)** (0.0016)** (0.0014)** (0.0013)*** (0.0012)***
Alpha (FF5F+UMD) 0.0007 0.0008 0.0010 0.0011 0.0013 0.0014
(0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012)
x = 0:6 x = 0:7 x = 0:8 x = 0:9 x = 1
Average Return 0.0029 0.0028 0.0028 0.0027 0.0026
(0.0015)* (0.0014)** (0.0015)* (0.0016)* (0.0018)
Alpha (CAPM) 0.0035 0.0030 0.0025 0.0020 0.0015
(0.0016)** (0.0015)** (0.0015)* (0.0015) (0.0016)
Alpha (FF3F+UMD) 0.0032 0.0030 0.0028 0.0027 0.0025
(0.0011)*** (0.0012)*** (0.0012)** (0.0013)** (0.0015)*
Alpha (FF5F+UMD) 0.0016 0.0017 0.0019 0.0020 0.0022
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0016)
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Table 7: Coe¢ cients from Regressing Trading Returns on Factors
This table reports the slope coe¢ cients and the adjusted R-squared from regressing the returns from a trading
strategy constructed based on the systematic disaster concern (SysDis) on the Fama-French ve factors and the
momentum factor. The trading strategy involves going long in stocks in the mid-SysDis quintile and shorting a
combination of stocks with a proportion of x in the lowest-SysDis quintile and 1 x in the highest-SysDis quintile.
The Newey-West standard errors with 5 lags are displayed in the parentheses below the corresponding estimates.
Asterisks denote statistical signicance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.
x = 0 x = 0:1 x = 0:2 x = 0:3 x = 0:4 x = 0:5
MKTRF -0.2152 -0.1715 -0.1277 -0.0839 -0.0402 0.0036
(0.0777)*** (0.0700)** (0.0627)** (0.0560) (0.0500) (0.0450)
SMB -0.2661 -0.2582 -0.2504 -0.2426 -0.2348 -0.2270
(0.0789)*** (0.0711)*** (0.0648)*** (0.0602)*** (0.0580)*** (0.0583)***
HML 0.2060 0.1897 0.1734 0.1572 0.1409 0.1246
(0.0924)** (0.0821)** (0.0727)** (0.0646)** (0.0582)** (0.0542)**
UMD 0.2350 0.1981 0.1612 0.1243 0.0874 0.0505
(0.0622)*** (0.0545)*** (0.0473)*** (0.0407)*** (0.0352)** (0.0313)
RMW 0.6145 0.5617 0.5088 0.4560 0.4031 0.3503
(0.0823)*** (0.0730)*** (0.0648)*** (0.0580)*** (0.0531)*** (0.0509)***
CMA 0.3041 0.2741 0.2441 0.2141 0.1841 0.1541
(0.1188)** (0.1052)*** (0.0923)*** (0.0804)*** (0.0701)*** (0.0622)**
Adj R2 0.6991 0.6969 0.6903 0.6759 0.6478 0.5976
x = 0:6 x = 0:7 x = 0:8 x = 0:9 x = 1
MKTRF 0.0473 0.0911 0.1349 0.1786 0.2224
(0.0415) (0.0398)** (0.0402)*** (0.0426)*** (0.0466)***
SMB -0.2192 -0.2114 -0.2035 -0.1957 -0.1879
(0.0611)*** (0.0661)*** (0.0729)*** (0.0809)** (0.0899)**
HML 0.1084 0.0921 0.0758 0.0595 0.0433
(0.0531)** (0.0551)* (0.0599) (0.0669) (0.0754)
UMD 0.0135 -0.0234 -0.0603 -0.0972 -0.1341
(0.0297) (0.0306) (0.0339)* (0.0391)** (0.0454)***
RMW 0.2975 0.2446 0.1918 0.1389 0.0861
(0.0516)*** (0.0551)*** (0.0609)*** (0.0684)** (0.0772)
CMA 0.1241 0.0942 0.0642 0.0342 0.0042
(0.0578)** (0.0575) (0.0615) (0.0690) (0.0790)
Adj R2 0.5187 0.4217 0.3438 0.3160 0.3309
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Table 8: Systematic Disaster Concern and Firm Characteristics
This table shows the average values of rm characteristics for portfolios of stocks sorted by the systematic
disaster concern (SysDis): For each portfolio, I compute the equal-weighted average value of each characteristic in
each month, and the table reports the averages of the portfolio characteristics over time. The characteristics examined
include the CAPM beta (Beta); market disaster concern beta (DisBeta); annualized idiosyncratic volatility (Idio);
illiquidity (Illiq); rm size (Size); book-to-market ratio (B2M); return on equity (ROE); investment (Inv); and
leverage (Lever):
Portfolio by SysDis Low 2 3 4 High
SysDis -0.0103 0.0917 0.2121 0.4016 0.7433
Beta 0.9099 0.8857 1.0149 1.1871 1.4332
DisBeta -0.1332 -0.1145 -0.1313 -0.1569 -0.1898
Idio 0.3357 0.2898 0.3220 0.3825 0.4753
Illiq 1.3872 0.6759 0.7562 0.9502 1.2309
Size 14.6615 15.4948 15.4275 14.9994 14.5786
B2M 0.4465 0.4229 0.4311 0.4440 0.4908
ROE 0.0325 0.0410 0.0376 0.0302 0.0164
Inv 0.0345 0.0294 0.0317 0.0365 0.0390
Lever 0.5347 0.5673 0.5496 0.5158 0.4920
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